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Abstract
The word “principle” has acquired an increasing semantic range over the centuries and continues to be used today 
in the search for the solution of moral conflicts. The present study begins by analyzing the different concepts of 
principle in Philosophy and Law. In addition to these fields, the research sought to study the interpretation of 
bioethics about the idea of principle, especially in the case of principlism. It was observed that the basic notion 
of principle has been used in the three fields analyzed - philosophy, law and bioethics - in a vertical way. Having 
presented the different concepts of principle (relative and absolute), these are discussed in a critical comparative 
way, and compared with the presumably universal notion of common morality. Finally, the text discusses the 
possibility of constructing a horizontal approach to these principles, using as reference the respect for moral 
pluralism, in the theoretical-applied line proposed by the Bioethics of Intervention.
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Resumo
Contribuição da bioética de intervenção à releitura do conceito de “princípio” 
O vocábulo “princípio” adquiriu crescente carga semântica durante os séculos, e hoje é utilizado na busca de 
solução para conflitos morais. Este estudo se inicia com a análise de diferentes conceitos de princípio na filosofia e 
no direito. Além desses campos, a pesquisa buscou estudar a interpretação da bioética sobre a ideia de princípio, 
especialmente no caso do principialismo. Observou-se que a noção básica de princípio tem sido utilizada nos três 
campos de modo verticalizado. Depois de apresentados, esses diferentes conceitos (relativos e absolutos) são 
discutidos a partir de perspectiva crítico-comparativa e cotejados com a noção presumivelmente universal de 
moralidade comum. Finalmente, explora-se a possibilidade de estabelecer abordagem horizontal dos princípios, 
tendo como referência o respeito ao pluralismo moral, na linha teórico-aplicada proposta pela bioética de 
intervenção.
Palavras-chave: Fundamentos. Princípios morais. Filosofia. Pluralismo. Bioética.
Resumen
Una contribución de la Bioética de Intervención a la relectura del concepto de “principio”
El vocablo “principio” adquirió una creciente carga semántica a lo largo de los siglos y hoy es utilizado en la 
búsqueda de soluciones a conflictos morales. Este estudio se inicia con el análisis de diferentes conceptos de 
principio en filosofía y derecho. Además de estos campos, la investigación procuró estudiar la interpretación de 
la bioética sobre la idea de principio, especialmente en el caso del principialismo. Se observó que la noción básica 
de principio ha sido utilizada, en los tres campos analizados de modo verticalizado. Presentados estos diferentes 
conceptos (relativos y absolutos), se discuten a partir de la perspectiva crítico-comparativa, cotejándolos con la 
noción presumiblemente universal de moralidad común. Finalmente, se explora la posibilidad de establecer un 
abordaje horizontal de los principios, teniendo como referencia el respeto al pluralismo moral, en la línea teórico-
aplicada propuesta por la bioética de intervención.
Palabras clave: Fundamentos. Principios Morales. Filosofía. Pluralismo. Bioética.
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The word “principle” is constantly invoked to 
solve moral dilemmas in different spheres, especially 
in philosophy, law and, more recently, bioethics. It 
is opportune, therefore, to analyze its real meaning 
and the meanings attributed to it in these distinct 
but interrelated fields, especially in bioethics.
Since ancient times Western thought has 
sought natural or divine laws to guide it. It was 
thus with the Greeks, as Mckirahan points out 1, 
and with Christians, more specifically in medieval 
christianity 2. Throughout the Middle Ages, for 
almost a thousand years, one of the central 
thoughts was the world view based on metaphysical 
principles 3. Engelhardt 4 considers that many people 
miss the Middle Ages, especially when they seek 
stable principles to support bioethical action. This 
metaphysical conception will be interpreted here as 
a vertical view of principle.
In opposition to this perspective, the purpose 
of this essay is to present a horizontal interpretation 
of principle, according to a bioethics based on 
respect for moral pluralism, and to question the 
adoption of predefined principles for the solution 
of moral conflicts in different sociocultural contexts. 
To do so, the study starts from the roots of vertical 
conception, from Antiquity to principlist bioethics, 
through the fields of philosophy and law.
The method of study was a bibliographical 
review, with an analysis of works by Aristotle 5,6 
and Kant 7-9 to deepen the study of philosophy; 
Dworking 10 and Alexy 11,12 for law issues; Beauchamp 
and Childress 13-15 and Gert 16 for the field of bioethics; 
and Garrafa 17,18, Schramm 19,20 and Kottow 21 to 
address intervention bioethics. Other authors’ 
works were also consulted in order to enrich the 
discussion.
The analysis of the different concepts 
of principle from philosophy is indispensable 
because this discipline is the basis of the search 
for understanding of thought and reality. The same 
importance lies in the sphere of law, since most legal 
decisions are resolved by applying such assumptions. 
Finally, the study needs to be deepened also in the 
contemporary context of bioethics, since principles 
are constantly invoked to solve moral conflicts 
related to the ethics of life, as well as being the 
branch of applied ethics that has been developed in 
recent years.
This study contrasts the principlist theory, 
which treats hierarchical and verbal principles, 
and the so-called “intervention bioethics”, a 
Latin American line of thought that works on the 
politicization of moral conflicts and respect for 
pluralism, with a contextualized and horizontal 
approach. Due to the extension of the theme, 
epistemological issues per se will not be addressed 22, 
nor will the controversy over concepts of morality 
and ethics, much less the history of ethics, since 
there is  extensive bibliography on the subject 23,24.
Concepts of “principle” in philosophy
It is not easy to define the concept of principle, 
since it has acquired different meanings in the history 
of philosophy. This is directly or indirectly reflected 
in the attempts to define the term in the various 
philosophical dictionaries, which have distinct 
definitions: that from which all things derive and 
the reason why all things are what they are 25; point 
of departure and ground 26; theoretical beginning 27; 
origin, base and beginning 28. Other dictionaries 29-31 
avoid conceptualization, only differentiating the 
types of principles.
In a way, most of these definitions were already 
found in Aristotle 32, who was probably the first to 
attempt to explain the word. For him, principle is: 1) 
part of something that can begin to move; 2) starting 
point; 3) originating part from which it derives; 4) first 
cause, not immanent; 5) that by whose will things 
move and change; 6) starting point of knowledge, 
premises. These principles, applied to science, have 
no demonstration and do not need one, because 
they are the ultimate foundation of knowledge. 
Thus, Aristotle’s theory of science became known as 
“fundamentalist” 33 or “foundational” 34.
It should therefore be pointed out that, for 
this philosopher, practical knowledge, specifically 
ethics, does not have precision and regularity proper 
to mathematics and geometry; on the contrary, 
this knowledge must be flexible as the ruler of 
Lesbos 35, which fits the stones to be measured. 
Thus, the principle of right action need not derive 
from theorists, nor seek cause, but must be situated 
in the field of praxis: it is enough to show only in a 
convenient way the fact that it is so, as it happens 
with respect to fundamental principles 36.
Following the Aristotelian interpretation in 
the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas 2 used the notion 
of principle with the sense of incipere (incipient), 
that is, relative to the beginning, beginning. But 
this idea is linked to that of primacy, priority, which 
presupposes succession or ordered set. Thus, 
for him, the principle has chronological, spatial, 
axiological or ontological priority.
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Such a concept also carries the notion of origin, 
just as in Christianity the Father is the principle of 
the Son, for the former communicates divinity to the 
latter. In the realm of logic, medieval philosophers 
understood that principle presupposed deduction. 
In ethics, principles are imperatives deduced from 
the moral conduct. According to Christian Wolff 37, 
the Scholastics did not depart from the conceptions 
outlined by Aristotelian metaphysics. By uniting Christian 
theology and Aristotelian philosophy, Thomas Aquinas 
emphasized the verticalization of the notion of principle.
On the threshold of modern and contemporary 
philosophy, Immanuel Kant also contributed to the 
idea of principle. In his “Critique of Pure Reason” 7, 
principle or knowledge by principles (aus Prinzipien) 
is that which allows us to know the particular in the 
universal by means of concepts (Begriffe). Once 
established, the word comes to be used by Kant both 
in moral theory and in his theory of law.
In his “Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of 
Customs,” Kant asserts that “grounding” is nothing 
more than a search for and establishment of the 
supreme principle of morality 8. Similarly, in Kant’s 
“Metaphysical Principles of Law,” 9 link all duties to 
one principle. Thus, it does not escape verticalization 
either by deduction 38 or by the primacy of imperatives.
After Kant, the notion of principle remained 
semantically unchanged. Controversy then turned 
to the kind of principle that would guide decisions, 
and utilitarianism proposed utility or greater 
happiness. In this view, Jeremy Bentham 39 states 
that the principle of utility is not susceptible of 
direct demonstration, which would be impossible 
and superfluous. The equally utilitarian John Stuart 
Mill 40 is sympathetic to the view that principles 
are necessary to guide the morality of acts. These 
principles, for him, coincide with greater happiness.
The reflection could be followed by an infinity of 
philosophers who defended several guiding principles, 
such as Hans Jonas, in the Principle of Responsibility 41, 
and Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition 42, but 
the scope of the present study and its intention do not 
allow such task. The objective here is to investigate 
how the notion of the original principle of philosophy 
has developed in law and bioethics, as well as to 
question the need to invoke principles, in a hierarchical 
or vertical way, as a basis for making decisions.
Concepts of “principle” in law
As in philosophy, the meaning of the word 
“principle” in law is not clear and tangible, not even 
among great doctrinaires. Therefore, the application 
of the concept has been the subject of discussion for 
many years, and there are many studies about its 
direct and indirect implications in people’s lives, taking 
into account decisions based on principles. There 
are different theories as to hierarchy and weighting 
mode, which will determine the use of one principle 
to the detriment of another in a given concrete case, 
or its application to a greater or lesser degree.
In order to delimit a concept of principle and 
the way in which it should be applied, it is necessary 
to distinguish it from “rule”. Dworkin 10 asserts that 
such ideas differ in the given orientation, since 
rules are applied in direct and concrete character, 
translating into “doing” or “failing to do” certain 
action. However, the principle states a reason that 
leads to the only direction to be followed. Thus, 
according to this author, principles are endowed 
with weight and importance that the rules do not 
have, and may even overlap with them, since they 
have a character of impartiality, serving justice.
Dworkin further argues that the application 
of principles must provide a fair decision, and its 
applicator must be based on existing principles, 
without freely choosing one of one’s preference, 
so as not to harm the integrity of the legal system. 
The author follows a chain based on the so-called 
“strong positivism”, defending that everyone apply 
an already defined principle, in order to guarantee 
a cohesive response in each case and, with this, the 
integrity of the legal system 43.
In another vein, Alexy 11 states that rules 
are regulatory devices to be followed, whereas 
principles are like values and therefore can be 
organized hierarchically, depending on the context 
and community in which they are applied. To 
determine how strong a principle is, we must take 
into account its similarity to the value.
According to this philosopher, the distinction 
between rules and principles is that, while the 
former are positive determinations, embodied in 
laws, the latter are normative, direct the maximum 
realization of something, according to legal and 
factual possibilities. Thus, principles would not 
serve to guide moral decision, but to improve 
the application of standards to a greater or lesser 
degree, depending on a concrete case 11.
It is true that in the interpretation and 
application of rules no antinomy is accepted. By their 
specialty and positivity, rules are employed according 
to the all or nothing system, consistent with the 
traditional mechanism of subsumption. So either a 
rule applies or not. Principles, on the contrary, only 
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state motives (closer to ideas of law and justice than 
rules), and are not categorical imperatives; they are 
imprecise, generic and logically abstract 12.
In summary, the basic difference between 
principles and rules is that the former represent 
legal norms compatible with various degrees of 
realization, and the latter establish permissiveness 
or prohibition in a less generic way. Rules describe 
factual and legal aspects of situations and are 
enunciated by laws; principles express values and 
guidelines and are based on constitutional norms.
Moreover, the relationship between antinomic 
principles is conflictual, that is, it allows for the 
balancing of values and interests, which does not 
occur with antinomic rules, since it requires the 
exclusive application of one of them 44. In this sense, 
it is important to point out that Dworkin and Alexy 
differ as to the solution of a given case based on 
principles. While Dworkin believes that principles 
have the same value and that the application of 
one does not exclude another, for Alexy they can be 
hierarchically arranged and in cases of conflict they 
must be weighed in order to apply the highest value 
in order to promote justice.
These two theories demonstrate the difficulty 
of establishing consensus on the concept and 
application of principles in conflict resolution. 
Despite the agreement as to its guiding nature in 
situations that arise daily, the problem is to answer 
whether the principles are in fact hierarchical or 
occupy the same level.
Many scholars of law tend to choose principles 
that can guide the solution of the maximum of 
possible problems, defining which ones would be 
hierarchically superior to the others. However, the 
difficulty in establishing priorities among these 
principles then becomes related to the hierarchy 
of values. It is even more important to know who 
is responsible for determining the prevailing values.
At first glance, this choice of principles seems 
a friendly solution to the problem of dissent as to 
which of them should be prioritized. On the other 
hand, even wider questions arise: which principles 
should be placed at the top of the pyramid? Can the 
same principle be applied unrestricted throughout 
the world? And, finally, who would be responsible 
for delimiting the importance of some principles to 
the detriment of others?
There are still remnants of aristotelian-thomist 
metaphysics in this attempt to hierarchize/verticalize 
principles in the field of law. In the discussion 
presented here, it is believed that bioethics can 
be a mediating instrument in conflict resolution. 
Through the dialogue between several theories, we 
try to demonstrate the importance of the interaction 
among different moral approaches.
Concepts of “principle” in bioethics
Bioethics is the field of applied ethics that 
has advanced the most in recent decades. Because 
of its inter and transdisciplinary nature 45, it 
receives contributions from several disciplines of 
the biomedical, human and social areas such as 
philosophy, medicine, biology, law, anthropology, 
sociology, theology, among others. As for the 
connection with the idea of principle, it is necessary 
to register the umbilical relation of its more 
traditional current - principlism.
“Principle” in principlist bioethics
In ethics, the word “principle” follows semantic 
variations similar to those that have been analyzed 
so far. Some authors use the term with the sense 
of indisputable statements, such as the principles of 
logic. One may cite, for example, Kant’s 14 approaches 
to bioethics that are strongly anchored in the axiom 
of the categorical imperative.
Concern for establishing principles for 
research involving human beings appears in the 
Helsinki Declaration 46 and the Belmont Report 47. 
According to Tom Beauchamp, prior to the 1970s 
there was no concrete foundation or commitment 
to principles in which biomedical ethics could take 
root 13. Thus, he and James Childress propose in 
1979 a framework with four principles - respect 
for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and 
justice 15 - explaining that they are recommendations 
to guide professionals in biomedical research with 
human beings and in relationships with patients. 
Engelhardt 4 also seems to understand the term thus, 
although he does not develop it clearly.
The concept delineated by the principlism 
approaches the one used in the professional codes, 
or in the “deontology”, word that has at least three 
meanings: 1) Kant’s theory of the duty (deontos); 2) 
moral ethics theory in general, by Jeremy Bentham 48; 
3) A set of duties linked to a profession 49. However, 
Beauchamp and Childress assert that principles can 
not be confused with deontological codes, since they 
are incomplete and devoid of adequate justification, 
which may conflict with moral rules. Principles, 
according to the authors, are more universal, 
although they are not abstract.
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In principlism, the term ended up acquiring 
various forms of application, with divergence in 
the number of fundamental principles 21, although 
its guiding concept remains basically the same. By 
accepting a plurality of principles, Beauchamp and 
Childress attributed prima facie connotations to 
them 14, that is to say they came to interpret them as 
not absolute. In other words, for the authors, principles 
express obligation to be fulfilled until there is conflict 
with another principle of equal or greater importance.
Faced with criticisms of the epistemological 
homogeneity of principlism and the non-universality 
of the four principles, Beauchamp and Childress 
introduced in the fourth edition of the book 
“Principles of biomedical ethics” the theory of 
common morality, with the clear purpose of giving 
more epistemological support to principlism 50.
The theory of common morality is founded on 
human nature, from the central idea that morality 
should be the same for all people. In other words, 
the set of principles proposed lacked coherent 
grounding in an impartial, universal system, shared 
by all rational beings and able to deal with moral 
issues. Including the idea of common morality in 
principlism was the way found by Beauchamp and 
Childress to escape the criticism they began to 
receive in the early 1990s.
Even the fiercest critics of principlism 
contributed to grounding the idea of principle in 
the field of bioethics. This was the case of Clouser 
and Gert 51, for whom principles are guides to action 
that summarize a theory and thus help the ethical 
subject to make a moral decision. According to the 
authors, the principlist proposition differs greatly 
from this conception, consisting only of a sort of 
checklist of the issues that are worth remembering 
when deciding something.
Thus, Clouser and Gert argue that the principles 
in Beauchamp and Childress’s proposition do not 
form an articulated moral system and are therefore 
unable to provide useful guidance. For the authors, 
a principle needs theory that bases it, otherwise it is 
bound to float in the midst of insecurities. It should 
be noted, however, that Gert 16 himself admits the 
idea of morals in the plural, living together in the 
theory of common morality.
Guy Durant 52 tried to get out of these disputes 
by introducing a new concept, based on the 
assertion that principles are imperatives necessary 
for bioethical research. In other words, Durant 
argues that bioethical principles are not abstract 
forms imposed on reality and can be questioned 
from the facts.
In any case, in the different strands and 
translations of principlism, as well as in its justifications 
and applications, the vertical view of principles 
remains, either by the metaphors of the hierarchy 
or the root. If this view makes the moral agent fall 
into aporia, it is important to think of another way 
of seeing and interpreting principles. In this sense, its 
horizontalization is proposed, for example.
“Principles” in non-hegemonic bioethics: bioethics 
of intervention
The present study is based on the line of 
thought that has been worked for almost two 
decades by the so-called “latin american bioethics”, 
in the wake of the so-called “epistemologies of the 
South” 53,54. Intervention bioethics was chosen as a 
conceptual and practical reference for the criticisms 
it has presented to principlism as an hegemonic 
current of the field analyzed, as well as for its 
pioneering and wide diffusion 17,18. In this sense, a 
counter-hegemonic bioethics must critically filter 
ethical reflections, always testing its assumptions 
and rejecting both absolutism (“moral imperialism”) 
and nihilistic relativism.
Ethical absolutism tries to ground principles 
at a fixed point. The problem is revealed when this 
foundation needs to be demonstrated, and this 
demonstration, in turn, needs another foundation, 
thus repeating the whole process. We can not follow 
ad infinitum, or disregard this logical requirement, 
as did Bentham 39, or we will always be seeking one 
argument for another in succession.
Some authors try to support their thinking in 
an ultimate principle, such as divinity. In this case 
there seems to be a perfect anchor to establish 
principles, but the contact of the believer with the 
divinity is almost always mediate, not immediate 4. 
In other words, usually the divinity speaks through 
representatives, which causes problems of 
interpretation. But if the deity speaks directly to 
the faithful, we will be faced with the plurality of 
interpretations of those who hear it.
The dialogue is also presented as a basis for 
establishing principles 23,55. In this case, the ideal 
situation of speech is a condition to consider authentic 
speeches, whose main requirement is the equal 
participation of the interlocutors. In this way, the 
moral results of the dialogue are rational and, in turn, 
they need the use of rationality to substantiate them, 
or an authentic discourse only occurs between people 
in equal situations, so it must be egalitarian. We come 
to a circular argument, “p” therefore “p”, in which a 
premise “p” is assumed to arrive at a “p” conclusion.
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Common morality, as the foundation of ethics, 
has weaknesses. A striking criticism of this theory 
was presented by Karlsen and Solbakk 56, for whom 
this discourse is allied to that of moral normativity, 
that is, the imposition of one morality on another. 
The authors ask whether the set of moral principles 
in common would not have been built by a 
hegemonic civilization that oppressed the prevailing 
values of the past and other cultural contexts. For 
these and other reasons, some bioethicists see an 
intrinsic relativism in this expression.
O’Neill 57, for example, argues that the 
ethical agents must guide their actions by multiple 
principles, of which few are really ethical. Matti 
Häyry 58 defends ethical relativism by considering the 
validity of norms and values in relation to a changing 
or diverse phenomenon or point of view. This 
perspective does not imply rejecting all norms, but 
opposes the idea of absolute principles. According 
to the author, a variation of subjectivist relativism 
reminds us that each person, culture and nation has 
its own points of view. Häyry concludes that true 
relativism is not nihilistic, on the contrary, it places 
value on all individuals and recognizes historical and 
cultural differences of principles and norms.
Kottow 21, an adept of Latin American 
bioethical thought, asserts that such unrestricted 
plurality removes all prescriptive force from 
principles, rendering bioethics unconvincing. In 
this sense, the author proposes that the principles 
enunciated insinuate the conditionality or context 
of what is being asserted. For him, imperative 
statements should reflect on various relevant 
situations and aspects.
Along the same lines and also contributing to 
the Latin American ideas, Schramm 19 believes that 
bioethics has at least two functions: a normative, 
practical one; and another theoretical and critical, 
or analytical. The first can be considered a condition 
of the ethical act. However, the author clarifies that, 
although the normative function solves dilemmas, 
it can not always provide concrete solutions, given 
that norms can be respected or not, according to the 
moral differences applied to each situation.
Intervention bioethics abandoned nihilistic 
relativism because it believed the term to be fragile 
and ambiguous. Fragile because if “everything is 
relative,” then the phrase “everything is relative” is 
relative. Otherwise, it may be said that “everything is 
relative” corresponds to “nothing is absolute”. Now, 
if “everything is relative” does not allow exception, 
then it is an absolute, which would compromise the 
argument. Moreover, the term is ambiguous because 
it also refers to what is relative to something, to a 
rule, for example.
Also against relativism, Singer 59 explains 
that if ethics were subjective, then, for example, 
torture could be considered correct and incorrect 
at the same time - both adherents of these visions 
would be telling the truth and discussion would 
be impossible. Today, interventionist bioethics 
prefers to substitute “ethical relativism” for “moral 
pluralism” 54. However, moral pluralism is not 
equivalent to moral pantheism 55 - a kind of faith 
in a subjective morality, with no openness to the 
other. On the contrary, moral pluralism is a space 
for respectful, multilateral debate based on diverse 
opinions and cultures 54.
So, how to speak of principles in the context 
of moral pluralism? The tendency is to increasingly 
distrust the idea of a moral agent as a person of 
principle. This erroneous view is based on the 
Western heritage that moral decisions depend on 
principles 60,61. Almost no one in the West wants 
to abandon this idea, since each subject builds 
principles for himself and judges other people from 
them, so that every decision, to be considered 
correct, must submit to the same set of principles 
created by the subjectivity and arbitrariness of some 
who have the claim of truth and/or have decision-
making power 61.
Principles are not eternal and immutable 
truths, nor can they be regarded as universal 
categories of guidance in all cases, for they are 
not flexible enough to cover all ethical situations. 
Whenever you try to impose principles on a 
particular issue or problem, you run the risk of 
creating some kind of distortion. Moral life is very 
complex, and situations may differ subtly or radically. 
Therefore, no framework of principles has ever been 
able to capture its completeness. Therefore, many 
ways are often taken, or when one way is exhausted, 
another one is sought.
While principlism uses the root metaphor 
and follows the vertical notion of principles, this 
study privileges the metaphor of the path. It might 
be better to return to the Aristotelian notion of 
principle as a starting point. However, one must 
make a caveat: these paths are not Heideggerian 
ones, only known by loggers 62, but those of the 
novel “Grande Sertão Veredas” (“The Devil to 
Pay in the Backlands”), of Guimarães Rosa, which 
intersect without colliding, in a come and go full of 
risks, successes and encounters 63; where rivers have 
three banks 19,64. Or, remembering Potter, where 
bridges are built. 64.
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If the concept of principle is understood in this 
way, points of departure and arrival may coincide. 
Looking at the writings of bioethicists who are not 
part of the mainstream, one finds that they seldom 
use the term “principle.” They are not concerned 
with conceptualizing it, although they discuss 
the subject, flowing naturally in the bioethical 
journey like the waters of a river. Berlinguer 65 and 
Callahan 66, for example, often use the word “goal”, 
demonstrating the major concern of bioethics: 
projecting it into the future 64.
Final considerations
In philosophy, the notion of principles refers to 
the point of departure or originating part (Aristotle) 
and the universal concept (Kant). In law, principle has 
a single direction to be followed in decision-making 
(Dworkin), but it can also mean an instrument of 
application of the norm, depending on the concrete 
case (Alexy). In mainstream bioethics, it is a universal 
recommendation that guides health professionals 
in biomedical research involving human beings 
(Beauchamp and Childress). All these interpretations 
are oriented vertically.
Intervention bioethics criticizes the feasibility 
of talking about relative and absolute principles, as 
well as the intention to ground principles in common 
morality 67. The question then arises again: what 
are principles? There are two solutions: the first 
would be to accept that, after so much searching, 
the principles were not found because they do 
not exist as hoped, that is, as dogmas, immutable 
values, applicable in all situations. Borges 68 tells the 
story of the disciple of Bodhidharma who mutilated 
himself in search of an answer. When the master 
asks him, “What do you want to know?” He replies, 
“I have searched for my mind for a long time and 
I have not found it.” Then the master replies, “You 
have not found it because it does not exist.”
Another possible way to conceptualize the 
principles would be in the mathematical sciences. In 
the nineteenth century such disciplines, in the face of 
non-Euclidean geometry, understood that the word 
“principle” was no longer adequate, since it contained 
nothing more than the idea of beginning, starting 
point 6, that is, the concept was made horizontal.
Before concluding these reflections, it 
should be added that in this way travelers should 
adopt a sharply critical view of the principles 
imported vertically and without question to Latin 
America - from the North to the South, especially 
for Brazil - in order to solve specific problems , also 
considering how these principles will be used. This 
conception breaks with the unilateral character 
of the domination characteristic of modernity, in 
which “knowledge” and morality are imposed by 
developed countries 69.
It is in this context that the bioethics of 
intervention - constructed in the Unesco Chair 
of Bioethics of the University of Brasilia almost 
twenty years ago having more than 60 published 
works by now 70 - is positioned: as a crossroads, an 
intersection of many paths, in which principles flow 
naturally based on reality, contextualizing the facts 
and respecting the moral plurality of societies and 
cultures, functioning as an academic and biopolitical 
space for meeting and discussing differences.
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